Is femicide increasing in Mexico? Gender specific rates for Mexican States between 2005 and 2010 in Mexico

State Level Change in the ratio of Female-to-Male homicide between 2005 and 2010

J. Creechan

October 2, 2012

The following table and two scatterplots use INEGI homicide data from 2005 and 2010 for each State (and DF) to analyze how the proportion of female murders has changed. Specific gender homicide rates were calculated for both 2005 and 2010: that is, the female homicide rates were calculated by the formula SpecificFemaleHomicideRate= (number of females murdered/number of females in State)*100,000 and the male rates were calculated by the formula SpecificMaleHomicideRate=(number of males murdered/number of males in the State)*100,000.

Once the gender specific rates were calculated, a ratio of female to male homicides was calculated. This value is listed in the table as RatioSpCrYR_MH where YR is either 2005 or 2010.

The first table contains the ratio of female to male homicides for each year (2005, 2010). Column one lists states in ascending order from the largest drop in how much females contribute to the number of murders in a State to those States with the highest increase in the proportion of female homicides after 2005. For example, the first row is for Aguascalientes and it indicates that it dropped from a high of 36.4% female homicides in 2005 to a relative proportion of 14.6% in 2010. This means that the ratio of female to male homicides in Aguascalientes had dropped by 22 percentage points in Aguascalientes in 5 years.

The biggest increases in the ratio of female to male homicides from 2005 to 2010 is seen in Campeche where the percentage of female homicides (calculated using specific gender rates) escalated by a factor of 3: it changed from 6.7% in 2005 to 22.7% in the Campeche homicide data for 2010.

Gender specific rates were used to compute these ratios since there are large gender population differences in many Mexican States and there are more females than males. That means that the ratios used in this analysis are conservative estimates that generate a smaller proportionate rate for females than when the overall population is used. Basically, the denominator for females is larger and generates a larger gender homcide rate and the denominator for males is smaller and results in a larger rate. Overall, this leads to a more conservative ratio of female to male homicides than if a general (total population) figure had been used to calculate gender rates. It is also more conservative than if the absolute number of homicides within each State is used to compute a ratio.

The table is colour coded to indicate direction (UP-DOWN) and degree (magnitute) of change in the ratio of female to male homicides to male homicides (based on gender specific rates). The turquoise blue States (Aguascalientes, Colima, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas) showed the largest drop in female contribution to the homicide ratio between 2005 and 2010. Overall, there were only 25% (8 of 32) jurisdictions where the female contribution escalated disproportionately. In ascending order these are Nayarit, Chiapas, Michoacan, Tabasco, San Luis Potosi, Baja California Sur, Hidalgo and Campeche. All Mexican States have seen escalating homicide rates, but this list is interesting because with the exception of Michoacan are NOT the States considered to be major battlegrounds in Felipe Calderón’s war. It is true that San Luis Potosi and Hidalgo recently escalated into major plazas because of expansion or internal battles involving Los Zetas, but the fact is that most of the escalation has in 2011 and 2012 and is not represented by this data.

Perhaps many will be surprised to see which States experienced either a drop in the proportion of female homicides or experience little change. Among these are the traditional drug plazas such as Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Chihuahua. Overall, it appears that there has been little change in the female to male homicide ratio in those areas of Mexico where the drug wars have been bloodiest.

NOTE: RATIOSPCr05-MH is the ratio of gender specific crime rates for 2005 (Mujeres a Hombres), and RATIOSPCr10-MH is the ratio of gender specific crime rates for 2005 (Mujeres a Hombres). The value in each cell is computed using the gender specific homicide rates of Mujeres and Hombres for that State in that year). An alternative would have been to simply compute a ratio of the homicide counts for males and females in each State for each year. These figures were computed and produce no differences in the overall pattern. Source: INEGI

The data in the table has been plotted in scatterplots in two different sequential orders, and these scatterplots of the changes provide a graphic representation of how female and male homicide rates have changed relative to each other in the census period 2005 to 2010. The changes in these years are primarily related to Felipe Calderón’s escalation of the drug war. Ideally, the same analysis should have focused on his sexenio period (2006 to 2012), but the fact is that there are no homicide figures for 2012 and in fact the only years that the population estimates are reasonably accurate are the census years.

The following scatterplot uses these proportions and plots them against each other. The blue line (top line on the left) in the graph is the data series for 2005, and the red line (bottom line on the left side) is from 2010. The scatterplot also includes drop lines (gray) indicating the size of the change (drop) within each State, and an increase line (light red) indicating how female homicides have contributed a greater proportion of homcides. It is obvious that there is a part of the scatterplot on the right hand side there the two census years are indistinguishable from each other. The States of Sinaloa, Vera Cruz and Queretaro are essentially unchanged.

I also examined the correlation coefficient between “change in the overall homicide rate” (for each State) and the “ratio of female to male homicides” within each State and it is effectively zero (r=-.01). Basically, this means that there is no relationship between the increase in the overall number of homicides and the relative proportion of female homicides.

The ratio of female to male homicides in the scatterplot presents the data for each State in sequential order from largest decline to largest increase in female-to-male ratios between 2010 and 2005 

The ratio of female to male homicides in the scatterplot presents the data for each State in sequential order from the lowest contribution value for females in the female-to-male ratios in 2005. The pink blocks are States with increases and the green blocks represent a drop in the level female homicide contributes to the ratio.

Felipe Calderón's Revenge - The Vendetta against MVS

I recently realized how little I know about an important communication battleground that has the potential to impede political and social progress in Mexico and to silence the voice of protest. In fact, the battle in Mexico is another example of what has been called "the new cold war" by sociologist Philip N. Howard. In a blog that quickly became widely cited, Howard says:

"There is a new Cold War starting. It does not involve opposing military forces, but it does involve competing ideas about how political life should be organized. The battles are between broadcast media outlets and social-media upstarts, which have very different approaches to news production, ownership and censorship." (Read full article at: http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/08/01/social-media-and-the-new-cold-war/).

Howard is specifically referring to the battle in Russia and other totalitarian states  to control and limit the power of alternative expressions and information outlets (think Pussy Riot), but his general argument about limiting access to news and silencing voices of dissent also applies to Mexico. The Mexican government has not made any obvious attempts to block individual access to social media, it has nevertheless undertaken to silence those who do not speak well of Mexico. The Calderón government introduced a campaign to encourage everyone in Mexico to say only positive things about Mexico, and in the final months of the PAN sexenio the Calderón government and the putative president elect Enrique Peña Nieto both contracted with international public relations firms to promote their personal positive image.


But the most important battleground of this "Mexican Cold War" involves a plaza dispute for Broad Band Spectrum licensing. Here, a fight to control the 2.5 GHz broad-band media rights has become the proxy battlefield where  powerful economic and political forces are engaged in a battle to control the hearts and minds and the pursestrings of Mexicans.

The political battle is about a licence for the 2.5 Ghz broadband spectrum (see a Forbes report at http://www.forbes.com/sites/joanlappin/2012/06/29/the-whole-world-is-moving-toward-2-5mhz-spectrum-as-u-s-investors-ignore-clearwire/) and whoever ends up with the rights to use 2.5 GHz will have the potential to control or to protect freedom of speech, journalistic integrity and a powerful propaganda machinery. The outcome will be one of two radically different alternatives— either a powerful ideological machinery or alternative outlets for public enlightenment and marginalized voices. 

THE ISSUE:

The case is about the Calderon government decision to take away a longstanding permission from one company that has provided 2.5 Ghz services in Mexico and to hand over this licence to one of the two existing duopoly media empires (Televisa). The license ("permission to use") was originally granted to the family of Joaquin Vargas Guajardo a number of years ago. At the time, this broadband range was not considered commercially viable and no-one appreciated its potential importance,  nor did anyone anticipate how it has become one of the central battlegrounds of telecommunications in the internet and wireless age. 

Joaquin Vargas and his family used the 2.5 Ghz broadband frequency licence to introduce and foster a wide range of telecommunication point-to-point services in their telecommunications company named MVS. Vargas describes the goals and purpose of  MVS this way (http://www.mvs.com.mx/inicio)

MVS COMUNICACIONES, Una empresa innovadora.

En 1967, el instinto de negocio y la visión innovadora de Joaquín Vargas Gómez guiaron la apertura de Stereorey, la primera estación de radio FM estéreo en México. En ese momento él no lo sabía, pero al crear esta estación, también puso los cimientos de lo que sería MVS, una de las empresas de comunicaciones más importantes de México y América Latina.

Ese espíritu innovador ha sido nuestro motor desde hace mas de cuatro décadas. Hemos sido pioneros en incorporar incontables avances tecnológicos en el mundo de las telecomunicaciones, muchos de ellos aún vigentes, y lo hemos hecho con la firme creencia de que en México hay talento y grandes posibilidades de crecimiento. Hemos sido innovadores también en la creación de contenidos, en el estilo y forma de comunicar e, incluso, en la manera de administrar cada negocio.

Google translation into English

MVS Communications, an innovative company.

In 1967, the business instinct and innovative vision guided Joaquín Vargas Gómez Stereorey opening, the first stereo FM radio station in Mexico. At that time he did not know, but to create this season, also laid the foundations of what would MVS, one of the largest communications companies in Mexico and Latin America.

That spirit of innovation has been our driving force for more than four decades. We have pioneered countless incorporate technological advances in the telecommunications world, many of them still in force, and have done so with the firm belief that Mexico has talent and great potential for growth. We have also been innovative in creating content, style and way of communicating and even on how to manage each business.

MVS grew into an innovative and diverse company that provided radio and streaming services via more than 130 broad band stations (radio and television), and approximately 2/3 of those stations were created and financed by MVS itself. Many of those outlets provided public information that was not available through official channels, and in many cases was the only place where alternative views to the official hegemony could be heard. Arguably, the success of MVS in Mexico in providing these services and yet remaining financially viable is a major reason that other international telephone and telecommunication providers are reviewing how to develop this same broad-band frequency elsewhere! Several regulatory agencies  (eg Australia, NZ) are re-evaluating how to licence and regulate this broadband range that opens up a wide spectrum of communication outlets.

The Importance of 2.5 GHz services in Mexico

Most importantly, many of the radio and streaming programs in Mexico engaged in outstanding investigative journalism and served as a true "fifth estate" in pointing to the abuses and corruption of government power, military violations of human rights in conducting the drug war, the non-transparency and inequality inherent in the Mexican justice system, and the outright abuses of power by the oligarchies that dominate Mexico. One of the most outstanding and well-known MVS voices is the journalist and talk-show host Carmen Aristegui. 

Several stations broadcasting from MVS frequencies and through broadband streaming stations became major thorns in the side of politicians of all stripes—including Vicente Fox, Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador and Felipe Calderón. Carmen Aristegui became one of the most famous journalists in Mexico because she regularly provided information and hosted experts who addressed the flawed drug war, the inexplicable ways in which Felipe Calderon's family and friends escaped prosecution in the aftermath of the ABC Day Care Tragedy that killed 44 children, and even the personal shortcomings and inadequacies of politicians like Felipe Calderon Hinojosa. Although Aristegui brought to light many facts and issues that would anger Felipe Calderón,  her interviews focusing on his well-known alcoholism were especially vexing and irritating and drove him into a black rage. There is no doubt that she was public enemy number one in Calderon's mind, and as a result MVS and Joaquin Vargas came under direct attack.

Suspension from broadcasting and reinstatement

In February of 2011, Carmen Aristegui's contract was not renewed under mysterious circumstances, but she was later reinstated with even less information. Carmen Aristegui provides more details about these events in a reforma op-ed column from August 24, 2012 and more details are being revealed day by day as documents and electronic communications are released and made public. (See Reporte Indigo- los BBLeaks de MVS )When these events happened, there was a public outrage and extensive news coverage in many of the traditional media outlets (La Jornada, Reforma, Proceso). Documents recently made available make it clear that this February firing resulted from herrefusal to apologize for a program in which she editorialized about Felipe Calderon's alcoholism and his inability to perform his duties.

But the removal of the licence from Joaquin Vargas was unlikely limited to the Aristegui incident. Over time, MVS and many of its other streaming services emerged as the prime outlet for leftist Progresista movement in the election campaign, and MVS provided several outlets for  intellectuals, government critics, international observers and informed citizens to make critiques and present reasonable alternative views to the government policies.

Felipe Finally Gets his Revenge

But Felipe Calderón eventually would have his pound of flesh! In July of this year,  the government withdrew this longstanding licence (Permission?) that had been granted to the Vargas family to offer 2.5 GHz services. Even more remarkably, it handed  the licence to Televisa in a gift wrapped pacakge— making the Televisa media empire even more powerful and influential in . There is no need here to point out how Televisa was directly involved in the election campaign on behalf of PRI's Enrique Peña Nieto nor that its blatant agenda of support for the PRI remains one main focal points the #YoSoy132 campaign against corruption, oligarchies and abuse of power. Nor is there time to review out all of the intricate ways that Televisa has involved in promoting Enrique Peña Nieto directly through its  public relations for pay service teams and on air favourable coverage.

Newspapers in Mexico have provided extensive coverage to this 2.5 GHz story, but to this point there are no English language reports about this blatant attempt to silence freedom of speech and alternative viewpoints in Mexico. If Felipe Calderon remains unchallenged, the duopolistic media powers Televisa and TV Azteca will emerge with even more influence, and the voices of reasonable journalists and intellectuals in Mexico will have limited outlet. To bend and paraphrase Televisa's founder Emilio Izcarraga famous dictum— everyone will be fucked, not just the poor.

Indications are that Joaquin Vargas is a decent and honourable man and evidence supports the idea that he has always managed MVS fairly and in a transparent way. He has never made waves nor tried to influence elections nor government policy, and has remained in the background. But he has been fighting back and has been confronting the Calderón government directly with the facts. Spokespeople (voceros) for Felipe Calderon are working hard to make the argument that this is just about a businessman who does not want to pay a fee to use a valuable bandwidth — but it is clearly much more ominous and has been described by Proceso as Calderon's revenge. (edition 1858 http://www.proceso.com.mx/?page_id=317434 and an in-depth report by Jenaro Villamil http://www.proceso.com.mx/?page_id=278958&a51dc26366d99bb5fa29cea4747565fec=317358)

The Mexican government also claims that it was Joaquin Vargas himself who offered to fire Carmen Aristegui, but in a press conference (http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/08/23/politica/002n1pol) Vargas calmly fired back and denied this allegation. He presented documents that clearly show that the pressure came directly from Calderón and that he was offered the renewal of his family license for 2.5 Ghz services if she were fired and removed from the air. (The documents are available at http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/infograficas/negocios/documentos_mvs_220812.pdf)

This retraction of this 2.5 GHz licence is a complicated and troubling incident with important implications for transparency, the freedom of the press, and for democratic development in Mexico. And sadly, it is NOT being covered in the English language press.

Fisgón - la Jornada August 25, 2012

Lorenzo Meyer (Reforma, August 23) published a column that presents basic facts and events, and also suggests why it is important that those who believe in intellectual, academic and political freedom should monitor this development closely. (see 'Quién consigue qué, cómo y cuándo' on Reforma's site, or look for a reprint of it in other Mexican newspapers). But Raymundo Riva Palacio describes the unique and unusual stance of Joaquin Vargas Guajardo, especially in the eje central column entitled Citizen Joaquin where he may in fact have offered to deliver Carmen Aristegui's head on a platter. Vargas may not be the perfect hero, but he has taken a courageous stance in opposing the oligarchy and he has done this in a country that is familiar with the brutality of power. Even if Vargas did offer to curb Aristegui, we might be able to forgive him given a business culture that thrives on threat and bullying.

This incident is a troubling threat to democracy, and it is truly hard to know whether everyone involved is a villain or a hero.  But the battle is one that deserves to be covered in more detail in the international press. If there are no external monitors and observers, Mexico will be in even more danger of becoming another 20th century example of totalitarian state described in George Orwell's "1984".

Global implications

This battle in Mexico seems to have focused on one specific area where very few people are paying attention to the larger consequences. But this is an important issue that has implications that extend far beyond the Mexican borders. The student protests and #YoSoy132 movement in Mexico undertand why it is important to curb and place limits on media power, and they have correctly identified the threat to democracy represented by the duopolistic powers of Televisa and TVAzteca. Outside of Mexico, few of us our paying attention to this battle and even fewer of us understand the implications.